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To the extent that international trade and development policy employs legal methods,
institutions and participants, there is a need to take into account the role of legal culture. There are
many different legal cultures in the world, including the widely found common and civil law
traditions, as well as the many non-western legal traditions and sub-traditions found within the
hundreds of different legal systems spread across the globe. International law has, however,
traditionally eschewed consideration of legal culture—arguing that international law is unique, is
sui generis, and as such domestic legal traditions were not relevant. Yet, the humans involved in
creating and nurturing international legal fields and institutions will themselves reflect the legal
culture of their home states, and will often import aspects of those legal cultures into international
law. The same must be true of international development law. In addition, international legal
fields, such as international development law, must often work within domestic legal systems, and
as such they will directly interact with the domestic legal traditions. It is thus important to
understand the interaction between the legal cultures reflected in the relevant part of that
international law and in that of the domestic legal system. Such an understanding can be useful in
ensuring the effective interaction of the two systems. This paper explores these themes, continuing
the author’s past and ongoing consideration of the role of legal culture in international law,
including its role within institutions such as the World Trade Organization.
KEYWORDS: international development law, World Trade Organization
Author Notes: Professor Picker is an Associate Professor at the Law Faculty of the University of
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The goal of this paper is to present a methodology, a legal cultural analysis, 
through application of that methodology to a specific issue—international 
development law. As an initial matter, this paper will engage in a brief legal 
cultural analysis of the field as a whole. The paper will then present a more 
detailed legal cultural analysis of one of the institutions involved in international 
development law—the WTO. Finally, the paper will then undertake an analysis of 
the legal cultural issues that may arise during domestic implementation of 
international development law. Nonetheless, this paper is as much about 
suggesting a way of thinking about international development law as it is intended 
to convey content. Indeed, the nature of the underlying subject matter, 
international development law, is so often the source of disagreement and 
controversy that the substantive analysis may itself in some cases be so contested 
as to rule out its general utility.1 The neutral methodology, in contrast, that is 
showcased in this paper should prove to be a highly beneficial methodology for 
international development law and other international fields. Indeed, this paper is 
really part of an ongoing larger body of work of the author—a more 
comprehensive trial of the legal cultural methodology within international law, 
focusing on the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”). As such, many of the 
examples in this paper will be taken from the WTO context.2 That work is itself a 
continuation of previous comparative analyses of international law as a whole.3 
To the extent that international development law employs legal methods, 
institutions, and participants, then it is also a field for which this legal cultural 
methodology may be usefully employed.  
 There are many different legal cultures in the world, including those found 
in the dominant western common and civil law traditions. In addition, there are 
                                                 
1  Daniel D. Bradlow, Development Decision Making and the Content of International 
Development Law, 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (2004), 195. 
2 The research here is part of a larger study by the author that will be part of the author’s PhD 
thesis. Some of it has already been published. See, for example, Colin B. Picker (Picker (WTO)), 
“A Framework for Comparative Analyses of International Law and its Institutions: Using the 
Example of the World Trade Organization”, in E.C. Ritaine, S.P. Donlan and M. Sychold (eds.), 
Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal systems (Swiss Institute of Comp. Law, 2010); Colin B. 
Picker (Picker (China)), China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the 
WTO, Parts 1 of 4, Proceedings of the University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science. 
(forthcoming January 2011); Colin B. Picker (Picker (Methodology)), Comparative Law 
Methodology & American Legal Culture: Obstacles and Opportunities, Roger Williams 
University of Law Review (forthcoming, January 2011). 
3  See, for example, Colin B. Picker (Picker (International Law)), International Law’s Mixed 
Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2008), 
1093; Colin B. Picker, Beyond the Usual Suspects: Application of the Mixed Jurisdiction 
Jurisprudence to International Law and Beyond, 3 Journal of Comparative Law (2008), 160. 
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many non-western legal traditions and sub-traditions found within the hundreds of 
different legal systems spread across the globe. International law and its subfields 
have, however, traditionally eschewed consideration of legal culture—arguing 
that international law is unique, is sui generis, and as such domestic legal 
traditions and cultures are essentially not relevant.4 Yet, the humans involved in 
creating and nurturing international legal fields and institutions will themselves 
reflect the legal culture of their home states, and will often import aspects of those 
legal cultures into international law and its institutions. Furthermore, they will, 
subconsciously for the most part, slowly and incrementally work together to 
create a legal culture for their institutions and fields. For those international law 
institutions and fields that have existed for decades, one would expect such a legal 
culture to be relatively well developed. That legal culture will then manifest itself 
in particular in its interactions with the state-based legal systems and cultures with 
which the international institution or field operates.5 The same must be true of 
international development law, for it too comprises individuals, working to a 
common purpose, building up institutional and substantive experience and 
knowledge, and in the process creating a legal culture for international 
development law. 
As an initial matter, let me define international development law. It is “the 
branch of international law dealing with the rights and responsibilities of states 
and other actors in the [economic] development process.”6 Admittedly, the term 
has too often been employed with little exactitude. Indeed, when this paper was 
presented at the Law & Development Institute Inaugural Conference,7 there were 
questions from the audience suggesting that it is not does not exist as a separate 
field and that even if it does exist it merely comprises a collection of unrelated 
“soft law.” Compounding these definitional issues are the significant differences 
within the field based on ideology. Those ideological differences typically fall 
into one of two camps—those within the “traditionalist” and those within the 
“modern” (or the “new international economic order” (the “NIEO”). 8  The 
traditional view: 
 
[A]ssumes that development is primarily an economic process that consists 
of discrete projects (e.g., building a dam, a road, a school, a factory, a mine, 
or a telecommunications system) and specific economic policies. It 
recognizes that development has social, environmental, and political 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Picker (International Law) (2008), supra note 3, p. 1090. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bradlow (2004), supra note 1, p. 195. 
7 See Law & Development Institute Inaugural Conference (Sydney, Australia, 16 October, 2010), 
available at: <http://www.lawanddevelopment.net/program.php>. 
8 See Bradlow (2004), supra note 1, pp. 199-210. 
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implications but argues that these should be dealt with separately from the 
economic aspects.9 
 
The modern or NIEO view: 
 
[P]osits that the economic aspects of development cannot be separated from 
its social, political, environmental, and cultural aspects and that 
development should be seen as a holistic, integrated process. From this 
perspective, development projects and policies should be treated not so 
much as discrete economic events but as episodes of social, economic, and 
environmental transformation that are part of an ongoing process of 
change.10 
 
Given the disagreements about the existence and scope of the field, 
international development law is clearly a controversial subject for which any 
assistance, or indeed attention, that can therefore be brought to bear on the field 
would be of great service to it. Presenting a new methodology, the legal cultural 
analysis, will hopefully help the field.  
One valuable benefit of the methodology is that it can help to close the gap 
between the two perspectives in that both are, for the most part, irrelevant to 
development of the analysis in this paper. This is because the issues of whether 
international development law includes only economic factors, or the social 
context, or whether the field’s law is soft or hard or declaratory or obligatory, are 
merely a few of the many legal factors that will be considered in a legal cultural 
context. Without elevating any of these factors above the others, they are all a part 
of the analysis. In other words, whether the scope of development law includes 
environmental, social, or human rights or purely economic factors makes little 
difference when what is being considered is the legal cultural context—the legal 
outlook of the substantive law, actors, and institutions in the field. Though, 
understanding the legal culture of the different participants in international 
development law will also provide insights into why the modern or traditional 
perspectives might have been better received in some places and by some groups 
than by others. 
Having defined international development law, it then just remains to define 
legal culture and legal cultural analysis. I have previously defined legal culture: 
 
The term “legal culture” is not a term commonly employed or understood 
within the law. While other fields, such as social science, may have 
considered cultural issues in great depth, in law it is relatively rare. In part 
                                                 
9 Id., p. 200. 
10 Id., p. 207. 
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this may because it is viewed as too “soft”. So, in order to give it greater 
strength I define legal culture to consist of those characteristics present in a 
legal system, reflecting the common history, traditions, outlook and 
approach of that system. Those characteristics may be reflected in the 
actions or behaviours of the actors, institutions, and even of the substance of 
the system. Legal culture exists not because of regulation of substantive law, 
but as a result of the collective response and actions of those participants in 
the legal system. As a result, legal culture can vary dramatically from 
country to country, even when the countries share a common legal tradition. 
Critically, legal culture is also to be found within international institutions 
and fields—for they too are legal systems. Those different legal cultures are 
critical for understanding the legal systems, for different legal cultures tell 
different stories, see the world differently, and project different visions. It 
should be emphasized that legal culture is not anthropology or sociology. 
For sure, culture is part of and studied by those two and other fields—often 
in ways of importance to the law. But, here, rather, everything that is a part 
of “legal culture” should be a cultural issue of legal consequence. Too often 
one can drift into non-law . . . . By way of example, to highlight the “legal” 
component of legal culture, the American or Anglo-American legal culture 
may be easily contrasted with that of the French or Japanese or Iranian. 
Thus, the differences in legal culture are clearly apparent when considering 
the expected role/behaviour/activities of Anglo-American judges versus 
those in civil law systems (passive versus active judicial behaviour); the 
role/behaviour/activities of American attorneys in business negotiations 
versus those in Japan (the significantly greater use of lawyers in the former 
versus the latter); and the role/character of legal sources in Anglo-American 
systems versus those in religious law systems (pluralistic and dynamic 
versus monolithic and difficult to change). Those specific legal cultural 
characteristics, simplified for sure in these examples, exist largely 
independently of statute, regulation or other positive law. They exist as part 
of the legal culture.”11 
 
The power of this method can be tremendous. Typically, when considering 
conflicts and other issues between states, the legal analyses of international 
interactions will tend to focus on the formal legal exchanges between the states. 
Such a focus misses a vital layer of interaction—the legal cultural interaction. 
Indeed, the legal cultural disconnects, for there will always be such divides, may 
often be the root causes of enduring and repeated problems between states. This 
may be true even between two supposedly close and similar neighbors. For 
                                                 
11 See Picker (China) (2011), supra note 2. 
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example, the past dispute between the United States and Canada, two countries 
that are exceptionally close by most indicators, over the use of the law to protect 
culture, is itself exacerbated by legal cultures with opposing views on the role of 
law in, ironically, protecting culture and competition.12  
Furthermore, legal cultural obstacles to good relations are unlike formal 
obstacles such as statutes, case law, and regulations that can be changed through 
the political process—albeit often at great difficulty, though formally possible in 
democratic systems.13 In other words, a simple legal issue concerning imperfect 
domestic implementation or even lack of transparency can be remedied by action 
of the government or appropriate political arrangement. But, matters of legal 
culture can be sticky obstacles—they are less easily overcome. For example, the 
European legal cultural attitude towards risk, exemplified through the 
precautionary principle, has proven remarkably difficult to budge despite repeated 
loss in cases involving that principle.14 At a more fundamental level, cultural 
obstacles, such as the legal culture of the judiciary that makes it subservient to the 
executive despite constitutional principles suggesting judicial independence, are 
more deeply imbedded, and thus, to the extent they serve as an obstacle, may be 
more problematic in the long run than simple legal conflicts. Too often such legal 
cultural characteristics are hard to see, hidden behind the formalism present in 
every legal system. Accordingly, identification of the legal cultural issues is the 
first step to dealing with such legal cultural conflicts. 
Identification of the legal cultural issues in international development law is 
not an easy task. It can be done in many ways, but here it will be tackled in two 
broad but different approaches: (a) a holistic and (b) an atomistical approach.15 
The holistic approach requires taking a look at international development law and 
legal culture from above. The atomistical approach requires taking a look from 
below. For each of the approaches there are benefits and detriments, but they are a 
good start for this initial foray into a legal cultural analysis of international 
development law. Though each will be discussed below, with conclusions and 
insights derived from each approach, there will always be the constraint that this 
                                                 
12 See J. R. Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2000), 48. 
13 Even case law, so long as it does not touch on constitutional matters (and even then in some 
systems), can be changed through the political process — for there is almost always executive or 
parliamentary/legislative supremacy over the judiciary in all democratic systems for all non-
constitutional matters. 
14 See, for example, European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998). 
15 This is the first of many binary analytical approaches in this paper. A binary analysis, while 
often a simplification, is fundamentally the basic analysis one can perform – “something either is 
one thing or it is not” – to say it is between the two merely means that initial “something” was not 
originally identified with sufficient precision. 
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II. A HOLISTIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW AND 
LEGAL CULTURE  
 
At the holistic level, from 40,000 meters (or feet) international development law, 
to the extent it involves law—legal obligations, rights and duties—exists within 
international law. International law is defined to be those “[r]ules and principles 
of general application dealing with the conduct of nations and of international 
organizations and with their relations inter se as well as with some of their 
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.” 16  All transnational and 
international development activities, policies, obligations, and liabilities clearly 
fall within the ambit of international law. Of course, there is a great deal of 
development work that takes place solely in the domestic context of states. But, to 
the extent that domestic-based policy is not related to international rights and 
obligations, such as through the domestic implementation of international legal 
obligations related to development, then it is simply domestic policy. As such, it 
would not then be within the direct ambit of international law or even 
international development law. Of course, such independent domestic 
development law should be taken into account when considering the field of 
development as a whole. After all, the domestic development policy is likely to 
interact with those parts of international development law that take place within or 
demand resources or attention from states. It thus may conflict with or 
complement international development law. Nonetheless, when conducting a legal 
cultural analysis of international development law, the domestic development 
policy can be put aside, especially for that part of the analysis that is from a 
holistic perspective.  
The holistic analysis of the legal culture of international development law 
can be elucidated through, once again, a binary approach. Namely, (a) that 
international development law is sufficiently similar to international law as to 
share the legal cultural issues of international law or (b) that it is sui generis 





                                                 
16 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations §101 (American Law Institute) (1986). 
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A. The Legal Cultural Analysis: Similarities between International 
Development Law and International Law 
 
The first approach considered here is that international development law is 
sufficiently similar to general international law as to share its legal cultural issues. 
That position is quite defensible—for both the “hard” and “soft” international 
development law. Thus, Article XVIII of the GATT, which provides explicit 
ability for developing countries to engage in otherwise prohibited trade practices, 
such as employing tariff barriers to protect infant industries, is clearly “hard” 
law.17 Furthermore, as a rule that regulates state behavior within the international 
legal order, Article XVIII is without a doubt a solid part of international law—just 
as much a part of international law as are international rules concerning treaty 
interpretation. Similarly, with respect to the “soft” law within international 
development law, one can see a similar congruence with international law. For 
example, Part IV of the GATT is as much a part of international law, despite its 
inherent “softness” 18 as are the many other examples of accepted soft law within 
international law. One of the greatest examples of “soft law” in international law 
was the Kellogg-Briand Pact.19 While clearly soft in its early years, it was ignored 
by everyone, and was later employed as one of the sources of law to support the 
Nuremberg prosecutions.20 Accordingly, even though Part IV of the GATT has 
had little impact on states, if accorded sufficient time and perhaps some minor 
procedural modifications, it might also be transformed into “hard law”.21 In the 
meantime, it is no less a part of international law than was the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact prior to Nuremberg. Given these realities, the consideration of international 
development law as being clearly within, and hence similar to, international law is 
not unjustified. 
If international development law is similar to general international law, then 
one can credibly argue that the legal culture of international development law will 
be comparable to that of international law. Of course, this approach assumes that 
one can identify legal cultural characteristics for international law. Such a task is 
obviously difficult and not one typically undertaken by either international or 
comparative law scholars. After all, international law covers a tremendous 
                                                 
17  See Yong-Shik Lee, “Development and the World Trade Organization: Proposal for the 
Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and Development in the WTO”, 
in Yong-Shik Lee (eds.), Economic Development through World Trade: A Developing World 
Perspective (The Hague: Klumer Law International, 2008), p. 6. 
18 Id., p. 8-9. 
19 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the “Kellogg-
Briand Peace Pact of 1928”), 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (27 August 1928), art. I. 
20 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 Yale Journal of International 
Law (2010), 71, 73. 
21 See Lee (2008), supra note 17, p. 15. 
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number of different subfields and issues, while comparative law does not 
normally handle international law fields. But, through the use of generalizations 
and simplifications, which are necessary evils in many comparative law 
examinations, an overarching legal culture of international law has been 
identified.22 That analysis, admittedly not a definitive analysis, has nonetheless 
identified some salient characteristics and insights that may be highly relevant to 
an international development law that is itself a part of that international law.  
Condensing that analysis, it was found that the legal culture of international 
law comprises some unique legal cultural elements; after all, the subjects of 
international law are sovereign states, but international law also draws heavily 
from both the civil law and common law traditions—but in a specific style and 
composition. Indeed, in the basic mix of those two traditions, in which parts they 
are strong and weak and in how they have been employed, the analysis suggested 
that they resemble the classical mixed jurisdiction systems of the world (such as 
Quebec, Scotland, etc).23 In other words, that: 
 
The “basic building blocks” of these systems derive from the civil and 
common law traditions. 
 
That, as a general matter, the public law is common law in style, while the 
private law, to the extent one can identify such within public international 
law, is more like civil law. 
 
In addition to these overarching general characteristics, international law 
shares with the mixed jurisdictions similar: 
 
(1) origins, 
(2) judicial characters, 
(3) linguistic issues, 
(4) approaches to precedent and legal sources, 
(5) receptions of the common law, 
(6) receptions of Anglo-American procedure, and 
(7) styles of commercial law.”24 
 
Thus, to the extent that international development law is comparable to 
general international law, then it too is likely mixed in some similar fashion. Of 
course, one would expect some differences due to the more specific focus of 
international development law, as well as some differences related to the history 
                                                 
22 See generally Picker (International Law) (2008), supra note 3. 
23 Id., p. 1102. 
24 Id., pp. 1103-1104. 
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of international development law. But where different from international law, the 
legal cultural analysis of international development law will be as provided in the 
next section.  
Regardless of the precision of the analysis, and reflecting the methodology’s 
value even in a very preliminary and generalized investigation, one is able to 
immediately identify initial questions, conclusions, and insights. For example, 
there is a question as to whether it is appropriate that the basic building blocks of 
international development law should come from the civil law and common law 
traditions. This question is especially pertinent given the presence of formal and 
informal non-western legal cultural elements in a vast number of developing 
countries. Another insight relates to the possibility that international development 
law, like international law and the Mixed Jurisdiction systems, will have to 
consider concerns related to language.25  For example, the possibility that the 
increasing use of English in the field might accentuate the role within 
international development law of the United States, Britain, and the other English-
speaking countries. Relatedly, that the common law, through its strong 
connections to Anglophone states and English language legal materials, would 
also become increasingly influential in the field. Indeed, it might then be the case 
that those developing countries that include common law legal cultures or have 
significant facility in English would have a greater influence or be able to take 
advantage of international development law more than the other developing 
countries. All these possibilities are probably not in the best interests of the non-
common law and non-English language world—which are, in fact, the majority of 
the world.26 
Other insights that can be derived from the comparative analysis of 
international law and applied to international development law include some 
technical legal cultural issues. Perhaps less obvious than linguistic imperialism is 
the issue of what law is imported into the system, the so called “path of 
reception”.27 In other words, in the mixed jurisdiction analyses that were found to 
be applicable to international law, adoption of other legal devices, including legal 
cultural characteristics, often took place “when the civil law field is, relatively 
speaking, both general and vague.”28 If applicable to international development 
                                                 
25 See Mary Ann Glendon, Paolo G. Carozza, & Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal Traditions: 
Texts, Materials And Cases On Western Law (3rd ed., Thomson West Publishing, 2007), pp. 972-
82.  
26 There are 51 common law system states (which includes 35% of the population of the world), 
and there are 115 civil law system states (which includes 59% of the population of the world). See 
Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International Commercial 
Code, 65 La. Law Review (2005), 677, 685. 
27 Picker (International Law) (2008), supra note 3, p. 1126. 
28 Ibid. (citing Vernon Valentine Palmer, “A Descriptive and Comparative Overview”, in Vernon 
Valentine Palmer (eds.), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family (Cambridge 
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law, then it could be the case that there would be a similar trend of increasing or 
decreasing presence of western or Anglo-American or civil law concepts where 
international development law is not so well-defined or specific. Another way to 
think about it would be that where international development law is more 
amorphous, and hence not directly reflective of other legal cultures such as non-
western ones, then Western legal culture will once again dominate—be it civil or 
common law in style.29  
Furthermore, as international development law matures and becomes ever 
more “real”, these issues will be even more apparent and the analysis ever more 
applicable. For example, when dispute resolution finally becomes a more 
common part of the international law of development, there will be a need to 
consider, as has been observed in the international law context, the character of 
the relevant litigation culture and whether it might conform to the trend in 
international law, like that in the mixed jurisdiction systems, where it tends to be 
common law-like.30 Also, the role of precedent will need to be more specifically 
considered in the context of the field.31 
While necessarily brief, this analysis, predicated on a similarity between 
international law and international development law, can be powerful at fleshing 
out insights and questions. This is particularly helpful for the relatively less 
mature international development law as it may then be possible to predict and 
anticipate, and then to avoid, some of the issues that may arise as the field grows. 
Indeed, even if one were to argue that the field as a whole is not sufficiently 
comparable to international law, the above analysis and insights might be 




B.  Legal Cultural Analysis: International Development Sui Generis 
 
The question here is to identify the factors that would lead international 
development law to diverge from the general legal culture of international law, 
and then, if possible, to try to identify the character of those divergent legal 
cultural characteristics. This is no easy task, for while international law is a broad 
                                                                                                                                     
University Press, 2001). (“Consequently, within mixed jurisdictions one finds greater common law 
intrusion in areas such as negligence. Another trend, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is that 
common law less commonly gains traction in those fields where the civil and common law 
concepts are diametrically opposed, such as in property law. Similarly, common law is not well 
received in areas of law with strong cultural aspects, such as family law.” Id. (citations omitted)). 
29 The issues associated with the western versus non-western legal cultures will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
30 Id., p. 1127. 
31 Id., p. 1125. 
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field including within it radically different subfields (from the law of the sea to 
the law of war), international development law is also tremendously broad 
(covering everything from regulation of “infant industries” 32  to public health 
concerns).33 One should then expect that there may be large parts of international 
development law that are not sufficiently similar to international law, itself a 
broad field not easily amenable to legal cultural generalizations. Indeed, 
international development law in particular may be more likely than many other 
parts of international law to be different from the rest of international law, for 
there is much in it that is dissimilar to international law in substance, style, 
origins, and objectives. 
As an initial matter, and outside the context of the civil and common law, it 
is likely that international development law will have a much greater presence of 
non-western legal culture as its objectives are most likely to be carried out in or 
concerning non-western countries than is the case for the rest of international law. 
This is further reinforced due to the consequently greater role of non-western 
origin scholars, jurists, and international law negotiators that will then work in the 
field. Indeed, the presence of non-western legal culture may be the single largest 
factor influencing the uniqueness of international development law. While those 
non-western countries will typically have significant western legal cultural 
components,34 there is no question that their legal systems will, in one way or 
another, include legal cultural issues that are not western and, as discussed below, 
they may consequently be different in ways that help or hinder development 
policy. Perhaps here is a good place to define western legal culture, hence to get a 
feel for what may be implied by a legal culture described as non-western. Western 
legal culture, existing not as a result of statute or case law, will have, among 
others, the following characteristics: 
 
(1) [A] distinction between legal and other institutions, with law having an 
independent existence and identity from the other institutions; 
(2) a theoretical separation of politics and morals from law; 
(3) administration of the law by trained specialists--lawyers and judges; 
(4) legitimate contributions of legal scholarship to the development of law; 
(5) growth and change of law as part of a pattern of development; 
(6) supremacy of law over political authorities; 
(7) a view of the competing legal systems and jurisdictions as independently 
legitimate; and 
                                                 
32 See GATT, art. XVIII. 
33 See World Development Indicators, World Banks reports, available at: 
 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>. 
34 See Barnes (2005), supra note 26. 
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(8) endurance of the legal tradition even when legal systems are 
overthrown.”35 
 
It should be noted that many legal cultural characteristics of the western 
legal tradition can also be found in non-western systems, but it is the full package 
together which defines the western legal tradition. International law does, at least 
as a formal matter, satisfy all these criteria and is hence solidly within the western 
legal tradition.36 But, to the extent that international development law does not 
include any of the above significant western legal tradition criteria, then its legal 
culture will depart ever further from international law’s legal culture. As a de jure 
matter, international development law will satisfy these characteristics. It is when 
one gets down to the more direct interaction with individuals and domestic 
systems that there will be the greatest influence of non-western legal culture, 
usually at the de facto level. Accordingly, when domestic implementation is 
discussed below, the impact of non-western legal cultures will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
Another legal cultural factor that may distinguish international development 
law from international law is that international development law is designed, 
among other things, to regulate asymmetric relations—from developed to 
developing and vice versa. International law, in contrast, usually applies between 
equals or deemed equals. The legal cultural reflections of the concepts of state 
equality and sovereignty are thus likely to be different for international 
development law. Another distinction is that there may be a normative content to 
international development law, not as typically recognized or accepted for other 
parts of international law. International law is, after all, a strongly positivistic 
legal system focused on states, while international development law is at times 
quite focused on the human condition. While international law will include non-
positivistic concepts, they are rare and confined to jus cogens and perhaps the 
fields of human rights and humanitarian law—fields that also typically focus on 
the human condition. It may be that the legal culture in those areas is also 
different from general international law.  
These few examples show that at a generalized level there is a strong basis 
to believe that the legal culture of international development law is different in 
many respects to that of general international law. Nonetheless, in order to really 
identify the specific legal cultural characteristics that ensue from any similarity or 
difference to international law, it is necessary to delve into a more particularized 
examination, an atomistic examination. As is shown below, when that more 
detailed analysis is undertaken, using the examples of the interaction of 
                                                 
35 Picker (International Law) (2008), supra note 3, pp. 1095-96, citing Harold J. Berman, Law and 
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 7-10 (1983). 
36 Id., p. 1096. 
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international development law and the WTO and domestic implementations, the 
legal cultural issues are more clearly laid bare, and one is then able to more 
effectively use those insights for the benefit of the field and as an example of the 
utility of the methodology. 
 
 
III. AN ATOMISTIC LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW  
 
The general insights derived from a brief holistic consideration of the legal culture 
of international development law must be reinforced by a more detailed atamostic 
consideration. An atomistic approach is typically more complicated and detailed 
than a holistic approach. However, it is also likely to be more accurate. A 
thorough atamostic analysis, however, would require significantly more coverage 
than can be provided here, which is not a problem given that the goal of this paper 
is merely to suggest a methodology rather than get hard results. In any event, such 
an atomistic analysis requires, as an initial matter, a review: (a) of the legal 
cultural issues of both the relevant international development law institutions and 
their substantive laws, and (b) of the many different legal cultural issues 
associated with domestic implementation of international development law in the 
hundreds of different legal cultures of the world. 
 
 
A. Legal Cultural Analysis of the WTO & International Development Law   
 
A legal cultural analysis of an institution should consider which legal cultures 
predominate within that institution.37 In other words, is the institution dominated 
by western or non-western legal cultural characteristics, or by Anglo-American 
legal cultural characteristics versus those present in continental legal cultures. 
More specifically, it is also necessary to identify which aspects of the institution 
reflect which characteristics of the different legal cultures. Those aspects include 
the dispute resolution mechanisms, the participants’ behaviors, the institution’s 
secretariat, and so on. Similarly, substantive fields, when cohesive and well 
developed, can also be considered under a legal cultural analysis. The questions 
are then somewhat similar to those applied to international institutions: whether 
the field employs aspects from specific traditions and cultures, and whether the 
field is implemented in a way reminiscent of one of the traditions. 
 
                                                 
37 See Colin B. Picker, “An Introduction to Comparative Analyses of International Organizations,” 
Comparative Law and International Organizations: Cooperation, Competition and Connections, 
(Proceedings of the Swiss Institute of Comp. Law, forthcoming March 2011). 
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Unfortunately, international development law has no one international 
institution or well defined substantive body of law in which it can be solely 
located. This is in contrast to other subfields of international law. For example, we 
can point to the WTO for trade; increasingly to the International Criminal Court 
for international criminal law; to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its 
institutions for the oceans; and to the CISG/Unidroit for commercial law. While it 
might be argued that this “failing” of international development law is one of the 
strongest indicators for why there is really no such thing as “international 
development law”, the lack of a central institution or body of law, while awkward, 
is not unusual in international law. Thus, even within the very sophisticated area 
of international investment law, we can see a similar situation, with a host of 
disparate institutions involved and with the law scattered throughout fora around 
the world. Indeed, the move to institutionalize and codify the fields comprising 
international law is of rather recent vintage. The role of the UN’s International 
Law Commission over the last sixty years has been to identify, agree on, and then 
to codify parts of international law that exist in many different sources and about 
which there are often conflicting views.38 
International development law does, however, exist as part of the work and 
objectives of numerous institutions and substantive fields. Those institutions 
include: international governmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, amorphous groupings of states and organizations, and a whole host 
of domestic participants, including the national and sub-federal governments as 
well as numerous domestic non-governmental organizations. Specifically, these 
bodies include: the WTO, the UN in general, more specific parts of the UN such 
as the UNCTAD, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the OECD, the 
G7, the G8, the G20, the regional development banks, the EU, ASEAN, OAS, and 
many more international acronyms.  
Substantively, it is the same story. International development law is not 
really a cohesive body of law so much as an unsystematic collection of hard and 
soft rules and regulations found across numerous systems. It exists within the law 
of other international fields and institutions, for the law of international 
development spans and penetrates many other discrete fields and systems. It also 
exists within States as a result of implementation of the various above 
international development laws, including through the Generalized System of 
Preferences (the “GSP”) in developed countries, and numerous pro-development 
laws and institutions in developing countries themselves, such as efforts at 
development for indigenous groups or depressed areas. Not surprisingly, 
international development law does not apply monolithically. It impacts its 
different constituencies in different ways depending on who and what they are. 
                                                 
38 See International Law Commission, available at: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>. 
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For example, states are impacted differently depending on their level of 
development and their economic model, such as whether they are market or non-
market economies. International development law also impacts people differently, 
depending on ethnicity, race, tribe, religion, social class, geographic region, and 
so on. 
Having described all that would go into an atomistical analysis, it is clear 
that a complete and atomistic legal cultural analysis of international development 
law would require legal cultural analyses across all international and other 
constituent parts. That is clearly too much for this present work. Accordingly, the 
only way then to conduct an atomistic legal cultural analysis of international 
development law is like all massive projects—with small steps, one step at a time. 
In this case, the steps are made up of those parts of international development law 
that are found in, implemented by, and under specific institutions, as assessed one 
institution at a time. In this paper, the institution chosen for the first step is the 
WTO.39  
Like the analysis of international development law in international law 
above, the legal cultural analysis of the WTO’s development law can be 
considered in one of two (binary) ways: (a) that it is like the rest of the WTO with 
respect to legal culture, or (b) that it is sui generis within the WTO with respect to 
legal culture. Of course, there will be parts of the WTO’s development law that 
are unique and parts that are similar to the rest of the WTO. For those parts that 
are similar to the rest of the WTO, one can then apply the analysis conducted in 




1. WTO’s development law is akin to the rest of the WTO 
  
If international development law within the WTO is akin to the rest of the WTO, 
then it should share legal cultural characteristics with the WTO. It has been 
argued that the WTO appears to be like a mixed system, with some characteristics 
closer to the common law and some closer to the civil law.40 While that research 
is still in process, some tentative conclusions have been drawn. In order to keep 
the length of this paper in check, only a few of those conclusions will be 
considered. They include, among other things, that: 
                                                 
39 In any event, an atomistic examination of the WTO may end up constituting a significant part of 
any eventual definitive atomistic analysis, for the role of the WTO is quite significant for 
international development. Furthermore, its role in the growth of international development law 
will likely increase over the years, especially if the current “development” Round of the WTO is 
ever completed. 
40 See Picker (WTO) (2010), supra note 2. 
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The WTO is more akin to the civil law in the large and significant role of 
scholars in guiding and creating the field. 
 
The WTO is a bit of a “mixed bag” with respect to the civil law versus 
common law difference as to whether it exhibits greater evidence of doctrine 
(civil law) or pragmaticism (common law). The WTO contains some 
elements of system and theory, and some elements reflecting an ad hoc and 
pragmatic approach, with perhaps the latter increasingly tending to 
dominate. 
 
The WTO employs strong de facto stare decisis, with the role of dispute 
settlement becoming ever more central to its law making! 
 
The influence of Anglo-American law firms and legal education is 
significant. 
 
The WTO Secretariat may be increasingly Anglo-American in character and 
style.41 
 
So, if the WTO’s development policy largely falls in legal cultural line with 
the overall WTO, then we can say that, among other things: 
  
The WTO’s development law should reflect a mix of civil law and common 
law legal culture; 
 
The role of scholars, largely from or trained in the western and developed 
world, may help determine the eventual legal culture of the field, and will 
correspondingly marginalize the contributions from the non-western 
developing world; 
 
That its development policy may likely be subject to development through 
decisions of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) with all the 
legal cultural consequences that go with case driven legal development, or 
that little development law will take place due to the few development law 
cases handled by the law-creating DSB; 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
58
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 4 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://www.bepress.com/ldr/vol4/iss2/art4
That it may likely develop as a result of pragmatic response to issues as 
opposed to development through doctrine and theory, though doctrine and 
principle may very well be present as an undercurrent; and 
 
That we may see a disproportionate role for Anglo-American legal culture 
within the WTO, both at the DSB and within the Secretariat. 
 
Using these initial inferences, one can then ask whether such legal cultural 
characteristics would prove to be beneficial or detrimental to the role of 
international development law within the WTO. The answer is likely to be that 
some of the characteristics might prove to be supportive while others might prove 
to be obstacles—indeed, some characteristics may be both supportive and be 
obstacles! For example, the likely growth of development law within the WTO 
through the DSB may be supportive, for the field is well served by the consistency 
of jurisprudence constante. Yet, the rationality of that consistency is not always 
assured, especially if only some cases make it to the dispute settlement system 
and not all cases proceed to the Appellate Body. Similarly, the field is also well 
served by the pragmatism that may be present in the WTO’s development law, as 
opposed to holding up progress for the sake of ideal yet potentially unattainable 
goals. But, sacrificing principle for pragmatism may undermine the “correct” 
development of international development law. Finally, while the system seems to 
have permitted Anglo-American lawyers to assume a dominant position through 
their law firms gaining expertise in WTO litigation and through the Anglo-
American method within the Secretariat and global legal education, perhaps 
highly efficient developments, those influences clearly provide too much power to 
one legal culture and may come at the cost of capacity building and diversity of 
perspectives in the development of the field. 
 
 
2. WTO’s Development Law is different from the rest of the WTO 
 
It is quite likely that the WTO’s development law has many legal cultural 
characteristics different from the rest of the WTO. As an initial matter, most of 
those parts within the WTO dealing with development, certainly those parts that 
are not merely aspirational, take the form of exceptions to WTO obligations and 
liabilities as opposed to positive requirements.42 Another difference is that unlike 
much of the WTO, development is a central goal in its own right,43 not merely a 
device to achieve another goal. An example of the latter might be the Agreement 
                                                 
42 See, for example, GATT, art. XVIII. 
43 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, preamble. 
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on Article VI, whose goal is to minimize discriminatory treatment caused by 
WTO members manipulating anti-dumping and countervailing duty regulations.  
Furthermore, perhaps more so than other parts of the WTO, there is a 
general division among the WTO members with respect to their positions on 
development policy that largely tracks the traditional power structure of the 
international legal order, and particularly of the international economic system.44 
That divide is, of course, largely between those members that are developed 
versus those developing. In contrast, such divisions are not so applicable for the 
other parts of the WTO. For example, for the Agreement on Article VI, there will 
be a wide diversity among WTO members of responses and opinions, often 
changing over time depending on domestic politics. 
Compounding the developed-developing member division within the WTO 
is the fact that most of the interested parties on the developing country side will 
have strong non-western legal tradition elements that may very well be reflected 
in their work on development within the WTO. Indeed, to the extent that the 
civilian/common law legal cultural characteristics are factors, as described earlier 
in the paper, there is even a developing country division there, for most of the 
“major” players from the developing world (e.g., Brazil and China) are not even 
part of the common law world. The one major exception is India, which has a 
codified common law and very strong non-western legal cultural components.45  
Another issue that differentiates the development part of the WTO from the 
rest of the WTO is that non-economic factors may loom larger with respect to the 
goals of development policy than might be the case in the other policy areas of the 
WTO—regardless of application of the “traditional” or “modern” perspectives in 
international development law. For example, for trade remedies, MFN and 
national treatment, the measurement of success will be more closely tied to 
classical economic factors and indicators. In contrast, development, while for sure 
concerned with such economic indicators in its goals, must also be focused on a 
wide variety of other non-economic goals, such as those identified by the World 
Bank.46 Those goals include consideration of economic as well as non-economic 
criteria, such as reductions in infant mortality, access to potable water, and so 
on.47 Relatedly, one may see a higher level of normative considerations, even 
                                                 
44 See An Chen, “A Reflection on the South-South Coalition in the Last Half-Century from the 
Perspective of International Economic Law-Making: From Bandung, Doha and Cancun to Hong 
Kong”, in Yong-Shik Lee (eds.), Economic Development through World Trade: A Developing 
World Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
45 See John Armour and Priya Lele, Law, Finance and Politics: the Case of India, 43 Law & 
Society Review (2009), 491, 499. 
46 See World Bank, supra note 33.  
47 Id. See also Colin B. Picker (Picker (Developing)), Neither Here Nor There—Countries that 
Fall Between the Developed and the Developing World in the WTO, 36 George Washington 
International Law Review (2004), 147, 150. 
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morality, in the development law debate within the WTO. While there is 
disagreement over trade remedies and regional trade agreements, the discussion 
rarely leads to discussions of what is the “moral thing to do” as may be the case 
when infant mortality is at stake! Accordingly, the legal cultural consequence may 
be a relatively smaller role for economics and a greater role for morality in the 
legal culture of that part of the WTO dealing with development. This may perhaps 
further isolate development policy from the normatively neutral and economically 
focused legal culture of the WTO. 
Ironically, even as development law’s goals look beyond trade and 
economics, another difference between the development part of the WTO and the 
rest of the WTO is that it is an area, more than others, held hostage to non-trade 
and often non-economic goals, albeit different ones than discussed above! This 
issue is most clearly seen in the context of GSP conditionality, where that 
preferential access is very often conditioned upon the developing country 
satisfying western and developed world conditions, such as the condition of not 
being designated a “supporter of terrorism”.48 Sometimes that conditionality does 
have a tenuous relationship to international economic matters, albeit those matters 
of particular high priority to developed and western states. In those cases the 
conditionality is based upon the developing country being considered, among 
other things, an enforcer of international arbitral awards, intellectual property 
rights, and labor rights.49 Very often those issues are simply inapplicable in the 
developing country or of relatively low priority given the conditions within that 
country.50 Yet, most other areas of the WTO, for GSP exists as an authorized 
exemption to MFN,51 are not similarly conditioned. While it is unclear exactly 
what might be the legal cultural consequences of this issue, it is clear that there 
will be some. Perhaps the legal cultural consequence may be, among other issues, 
the creation of a siege mentality, in which even useful foreign legal cultural 
issues, such as enforcement of arbitral awards, may be rejected or resented. 
                                                 
48  See, for example, U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook, at 20, available at: 
<http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1597>. 
49 Id., pp. 20-21. 
50 See Picker (Developing) (2004), supra note 47, pp. 157-158. 
51 “(T)he provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to the extent necessary to 
permit developed contracting parties . . . to accord preferential tariff treatment to products 
originating in (DCs) . . . without according such treatment to like products of other contracting 
parties.” Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Doc. L/3545 (25 June 1971). These 
preferences were made permanent in 1979 through the “enabling clause” of the Tokyo Round's 
Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade. This GATT act was later 
affirmed by the WTO, see General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade - Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Ministerial Decisions And Declarations 33 I.L.M. (1994), 
136. 
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History also differentiates the WTO’s development policy from the rest of 
the WTO, with concomitant legal cultural consequences. While all of the WTO is 
closely associated with the historical developments of the last one hundred years, 
and in particular that of the interwar period, it may be the case that the 
development part of the WTO is more closely tied to recent or different histories. 
Clearly, the history and legacy of colonialism (neo and otherwise) and 
decolonization is more relevant to the GATT’s and then the WTO’s development 
provisions than to other parts of the WTO.52 Indeed, history may be more relevant 
to development than is the case for trade law in general. Thus, the legacy of 
colonization continues to reverberate through the present development trade 
policy in a more significant manner than is the case of such historically significant 
events for the WTO as the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. True, that Act and 
other economic historic events of the 1930s were talked about during the recent 
recession, but the trade system has already addressed the problems that led to 
those historic events in Article II’s tariff bindings and in other parts of the 
GATT/WTO.53 In contrast, the continuing impact of neo-colonialism and the post 
colonial legacy continue to haunt development policy within the WTO. Perhaps 
the legal cultural consequence for development law in the WTO is to cast a 
backward looking sheen onto the legal culture, thereby undermining any forward 
thinking or growth in the legal culture and field.  
The legal culture of development law within the WTO is bound to be 
impacted by the fact that development law within the WTO is now part of a major 
realignment and power shift within the WTO. The previous dominant members, 
developed and western members, are now finding their power challenged by a 
developing country bloc within the WTO.54 That bloc is now demanding that the 
WTO resolve developing country needs before it agrees to any changes to the 
WTO. The Doha Round, otherwise named the “Development Round” was 
launched with that very goal, and its failure to meet those demands is one of the 
major obstacles to completion of the Round. After all, given the consensus 
method for approving change in the WTO, the developing countries essentially 
have a veto over any future changes within the WTO. Thus, development law in 
the WTO has now assumed a very high level of significance and priority, and 
until it is resolved to the satisfaction of the developing countries, progress of all 
                                                 
52 See, for example, Ruth Gordon, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO 
Multilateral Trade Regime, 8 Berkeley Journal of African-American Policy Review (2006), 79, 86. 
53Additionally, within the United States, the Congress realized that it should not be involved when 
it came to setting line item tariffs, and has ever since delegated that authority to executives who 
are more immune to the pressures that led to the Congressional “pork barrel” and “log rolling” that 
created that infamous tariff act. See Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic Constitution: 
Judicial Disciplines on Trade Politics, 42 Wake Forest Law Review (2007), 167, 174. 
54 See Lee (2008), supra note 17, pp. 5-6. 
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other areas of trade negotiation may be held hostage.55 It is hard to predict what 
impact this elevation of WTO development law and developing countries will 
have on the legal culture. Perhaps it will give strength to that part of the legal 
culture experiencing pressure from the developed and western world. Perhaps it 
will lead to greater isolation as attitudes harden and positions form at opposite 
ends of the arguments. It is too early to really discern the impact, but it is hard to 
believe it will not impact the legal culture of international development law. 
Finally, a major area in which the legal culture of the WTO’s development 
law will be different is in the fact that there is a relatively diminished role for the 
dispute settlement system both in creating development law within the WTO and 
in handling the WTO issues of developing countries.56 There are many reasons to 
explain this deficit, including that there have been relatively few disputes directly 
related to the specific substantive law of development within the WTO. In part 
that is because much of the law of development within the WTO is aspirational or 
discretionary and there then is less opportunity for those disputes to rise to an 
actionable level. Additionally, leaving the large countries of Brazil, China, and 
India aside, the asymmetric relationships between developed and developing 
countries, between whom the development law disputes would take place, 
militates against disputes being brought to the dispute settlement body, and hence 
the opportunity for development law to be heard at the DSB. Developed countries 
have little to gain (economically) and much to lose (politically) by bringing cases 
against developing countries in most cases. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, have few resources in which to bring disputes against often vastly better 
resourced developed countries.57 Additionally, even if they prevail, there may be 
political, and hence economic, costs. Finally, their ability to use authorized 
retaliation against developed countries would appear to be very limited, though 
this may be changing.58 The consequences of this situation will be visible in WTO 
development law legal culture in many ways—from less litigiousness to a 
diminished role for common law and western legal culture in development law in 
the WTO. The latter is a consequence of less employment of Anglo-American law 
firms. Similarly, due to less disputes on development law, there will consequently 
be less involvement of the developed countries, with a correspondingly smaller 
impact of those countries on the development of the law through the DSB. The 
                                                 
55 Id.  
56 See Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2009--A Statistical Analysis, 
13 Journal of International Economic Law Review (2010), 205, 207-10; see also Chad P. Bown, 
Self Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement (Brookings, 2009) at 
Chapter 4. 
57 Id., pp. 93-97. 
58 Id., pp. 134-35. 
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law may therefore remain closer to the treaties and principles. In that way, it may 
be more civilian in content. 
These few insights, from both the analysis of the WTO’s development law 
as similar to and as different from the WTO, suggest that the legal cultural 
characteristics of the WTO and its development law will clearly have an impact 
on development policy within the WTO. In order to understand the full impact, 
however, it is necessary to wait for the completion of the legal cultural analysis of 
the WTO that is in process, and of which this paper is but one small part. 
Furthermore, without consideration of the domestic implementation of WTO 
development law, discussed below, the story is necessarily incomplete. Much of 
the WTO policy, development or otherwise, takes place within the member states, 
through domestic implementation of WTO rights and obligations. Hence the 
atomistic analysis, and the presentation of the methodology, next requires a legal 




B. Domestic Implementation of International Development Law  
 
An atamostic legal cultural analysis of international development law requires a 
consideration of how it is applied by and within states. This is necessary because 
international legal fields, such as international development law, must often work 
within domestic legal systems, and as such they will directly interact with those 
domestic legal traditions. Even leaving aside the issue of legal culture, domestic 
implementation is highly problematic, with issues ranging from partial 
implementation to inconsistent and often opposite interpretations of the 
international obligations by national courts.59  
Many of the problems with implementation may, however, be caused by 
legal cultural disconnects. Needless to say, there are numerous domestic legal 
cultural issues that will present positive or negative issues for implementation of 
international development law. Indeed, within every state’s legal system, 
regardless of the level of development or legal tradition background, there will be 
legal cultural characteristics with an impact on the implementation of 
international development law. Furthermore, because the legal culture is different 
in all states, sometimes radically different, consideration of all the legal cultures is 
                                                 
59  See Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 
Boston University International Law Journal (1998), 331, 385-86. Compare E. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991), holding that the Warsaw Convention does not cover damages for 
emotional distress; id., p. 551, noting the sole decision from a sister signatory court concerning 
recovery for mental damages found that Article 17 should be read expansively to include damages 
for psychic injuries (citing Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 788 (1984) (Isr.)). 
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simply not possible here. Accordingly, this paper will only discuss some of the 
common issues that apply in many of the developing countries. Clearly, however, 
an aggregation of country specific studies and surveys is the best method for 
seeing the complete picture.60  
As an initial matter, the discussion earlier in the paper concerning the 
civilian and common law characteristics of international development law may 
prove to be a source of legal cultural disconnect or concordance for domestic 
implementation, depending on whether the domestic system employs a similar 
characteristic. Thus, if international development law develops pragmatically, 
then there would likely be problems for those domestic legal cultures that exist 
within a logical, principled and scientific legal system. Similarly, there will be a 
legal cultural disconnect between domestic legal cultures that exist within a 
common law system and those parts of international development law that are 
civilian-like. 
Regardless of its civil or common law components, international 
development law is for the most part western. This is necessarily so, as it is a part 
of international law operating within international institutions and usually created 
on the developed western world’s terms. As such, there are few formal parts of 
international development law that will not be western, despite a clear need to 
take non-western legal culture into account. Therefore, the single largest 
disconnect at the domestic state level, outside the civil/common law issues 
described above, will be the result of western international development law 
attempting to fit with or being implemented within non-western systems or those 
parts of domestic law which reflect non-western legal cultural characteristics. 
Given that a great majority of the developing world will reflect non-western legal 
cultural issues in their legal culture, this source for cultural disconnects may be 
rather significant. This is not to suggest that in developing countries the western 
legal culture is absent, so much as to say it may be significantly less present than 
in the developed countries. Though even in western systems, sometimes non-
western legal cultural issues will be present. For example, religious legal 
traditions and cultures may be present in western systems, very often in the areas 
of family law and inheritance.61  
Part of the explanation for the presence of the non-western legal cultural 
characteristics is that while most developed states have either adopted the 
common law or civil law traditions (via direct or legal colonialism/imperialism),62 
                                                 
60 See, for example, Picker (China) (2011), supra note 2. The author is also presently working on 
one focused study of the United States legal culture and its interaction/implementation with the 
WTO, but an initial idea of some of the ideas may be found at Picker (Methodology) (2011), supra 
note 2. 
61 See Glendon (2007), supra note 25, pp. 968-70. 
62 See Barnes (2005), note 26. See also Glendon (2007), supra note 25, pp. 68 and 320. 
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they still retained vestiges of their own pre-western systems—either as explicit 
legal characteristics that survived as unwritten law or exist through the western 
legal cultural characteristic being filtered through non-western filters. As a result, 
many of the western legal cultural criteria (see above) are absent in the legal 
culture of developing countries, either as a formal or informal matter. This issue is 
easily demonstrated by consideration of a few examples from African legal 
culture, where in many cases these criteria are absent or severely weakened. Of 
course, any employment of the generalization of Africa as one unit, whether of 
legal culture or otherwise, is clearly problematic, for there are numerous legal 
cultures within that continent.63 But that generalization is one that has been used 
by others in the past, including experts on African cultures and on whose work I 
now rely.64 Also, rather than it being a generalization, the examples here are 
merely ones that are not uncommon throughout much of African legal culture and 
are ones selected precisely because they are relevant to the paper. For example, 
the Western legal cultural characteristic of change and dynamism within the law 
may be culturally less present in Africa, in which the past may figure larger in 
minds.65 Given the dynamic nature of international development law, this may 
present a significant legal cultural obstacle to its implementation. Similarly, the 
role of religion is a significant force throughout Africa, even going so far as to 
imbue secular law with “religious or transcendent” significance.66 That role of 
religion may likely impact the place of positivism within the legal culture.67 
International development law, despite its heavy normative basis, must still rely 
on positive law to achieve its goals. Anything which undermines the role of 
positive law may necessarily undermine the implementation of international 
development law. Thus, these few examples from African legal culture clearly 
show the clash with international development law that may arise as a result of 
some of the non-western characteristics within legal cultures in the developing 
world.  
                                                 
63 The diversity within Africa is immense, with classifications including: Black Africa, White 
Africa, Saharan Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Nile Delta Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa, 
Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa, Arabophone Africa, Lusophone Africa, tribal Africa, and 
so on. The list is endless. See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, “Does Africa Need a Cultural 
Adjustment Program”, in Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, (eds.), Culture Matters 
How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books, 2000), p. 67. 
64 Id. See John Henry Merryman, David S. Clark, and John Owen Haley, Comparative Law: 
Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia 
(LexisNexis, 2010), p. 16. 
65 Etounga-Manguelle (2000), supra note 63, p. 69. 
66 Merryman (2010), supra note 64, p. 19. 
67 Etounga-Manguelle (2000), supra note 63, p. 70. 
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A specific, but large, subset of non-western legal culture is that of 
indigenous peoples.68 Indigenous peoples’ legal heritage has been described as 
chthonic, keeping with the earth and its rhythms.69 As such, there is a possibility 
that states where chthonic legal culture remains may be more open to the 
“modern” or NIEO form of international development law, with its holistic 
approach. To the extent that international development law focuses solely on 
individual projects from an economic perspective alone, leaving states to handle 
separately the environmental and social policies otherwise involved, there may be 
a disconnect between a legal culture that views all these things as related and not 
divisible. 70  In addition, chthonic legal culture in some cases has also been 
opposed to the writing down of laws, as it is believed that oral transmission is 
superior and appropriate.71 To the extent transparency is a part of international 
development law, this may present some implementation issues. Similarly, in 
chthonic legal cultures, as in communal legal cultures, the adjudication and law 
are accessible to all, with no barriers.72 That open access characteristic may clash 
with those parts of international development law that are less open. Indeed, 
international development law may exist and be developed within the relatively 
closed WTO, closed in adjudication and closed in access to sources, both 
confidential sources and ones so complex as to essentially not be available. 
Similarly, some chthonic legal cultures, while open to trade, have some highly 
restrictive characteristics with respect to commercial activities, including some 
that might be thought to stand in the way of development, though it is more likely 
that they simply need to be managed differently.73 Finally, and perhaps quite 
crucially, the role of the state does not fit well with chthonic tradition.74 This is 
evident in the revival in Africa and central Asia of “community-clan 
institutions”.75 Relatedly, there may be a cultural disconnect as a result of the top-
down decision making in domestic law, which inevitably arises as a result of the 
fact that international law implementation is typically handled by national 
governments, and not sub-federal entities, regions, or even peoples.76  Finally, 
                                                 
68 “There are over 370 million indigenous people in some 90 countries, living in all regions of the 
world.” UN Permanent Forum of Indigenous Peoples, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/sowip.html>.  
69 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (4th ed., Oxford, 2010), p. 63. 
70 Bradlow (2004), supra note 1, pp. 200-201. 
71 Glen (2010), supra note 69, p. 64. 
72 Id., pp. 67-68. 
73 See Glen (2010), supra note 69, pp. 68-69 & n. 29. 
74 Id., p. 86. 
75 Id. 
76 See Colin B. Picker, “Islands of Prosperity and Poverty: A Rational Trade Development Policy 
for Economically Heterogeneous States”, in Yong-Shik Lee, Won-Mog Choi, Tomer Broude, & 
Gary Horlick (eds.), Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2011). 
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there may be conflicts with respect to individual property rights obligations and 
community or tribal notions of collective property within international 
development law implementation, specifically in the intellectual property and 
investment contexts.77 
Of course, in part because international development law already includes or 
should include more non-western legal cultural characteristics, there will also be 
non-western legal cultural characteristics that might support the implementation 
of international development law within developing countries. For example, and 
continuing with African examples, there are greater communal and tribal law 
legal cultural characteristics in Africa.78 This may support development law which 
often requires community involvement, although this communal legal cultural 
characteristic must be balanced against the corresponding diminishment of 
individualism that may exist within African legal culture. 79 This then presents a 
legal cultural disconnect with international development law to the extent that 
individualism, via western legal culture, is a part of international development 
law. 80  Thus, it really then depends on the specific part of international 
development law at issue as to whether greater communal legal cultural 
characteristics will help or hinder international development law. Indeed, because 
the present international development law is so very western in character, one 
may wonder whether it will be possible to find an unambiguous case of a non-
western legal cultural characteristic that clearly supports international 
development law.  
Further complicating the issue, there may also be aspects of Western law 
that inhibit the implementation of international development law! This may be 
especially so for implementation in western states, when or if they ever are forced 
to deal with aspects of international development law which are non-western, 
such as support for community property rights. Also, there may be a legal cultural 
clash with western legal cultures that may result from attempted application of the 
“modern view” of international development law—which may help to explain the 
hostility of the developed and western world to the “modern” perspective on 
international development law. After all, application of that view may require a 
consideration of non-economic matters associated with environmental, social, 
historical, and other non-law considerations. Furthermore, any effort to bring 
consideration of matters of justice into international development law 
                                                 
77  See, for example, Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual 
Property, 19 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy (2005), 313. 
78 Etounga-Manguelle (2000), supra note 63, p. 71. 
79 Id., p. 71. 
80 See Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1998), 495, 503. 
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implemented in western states may prove equally unpalatable. Western legal 
culture more easily accepts the notion of “justice under law” as opposed to other 
notions of justice that are thought to be outside the context of law. All of these 
issues could easily lead to legal cultural disconnects for western legal culture—
where law is, as a theoretical matter, separate from politics and morality.  
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
While this paper is mainly concerned with presenting an example of a 
methodology in action, it also identifies some issues and insights about 
international development law. Perhaps the single largest conclusion is the critical 
interaction of non-western legal cultures with international development law. 
Additionally, it appears that regardless of which analysis of international 
development law within international law or within the WTO was applied 
(whether akin to international law/WTO or sui generis), the results were 
surprisingly similar—suggesting that the legal cultural issues may be widespread 
and deeply imbedded.  
Even the preliminary analysis provided in this paper helps to explain the 
relative lack of success and ineffective application of international development 
law within international law, within the WTO, and within domestic systems. That 
analysis clearly identifies many examples where the legal culture of international 
development law simply does not fit with international law or the WTO and has 
difficulties being implemented within domestic systems. But, as serious as some 
of these legal cultural disconnects appear, the fact is that while “sticky”, many of 
them can be managed if identified and confronted. Indeed, one of the central goals 
of the proposed methodology is to assist in such identifications and suggest ways 
of how those legal cultural obstacles can be managed. Typically, the solution will 
be based on the legal cultural characteristic itself or will be molded to deal with 
the foreign legal cultural characteristics with which it clashes. Furthermore, as 
international development law grows, in order to proactively deal with potential 
legal cultural clashes, the specific areas of growth should be considered under a 
legal cultural analyses. They should then be examined against comparable legal 
cultural issues within general international law and within the WTO, and any 
lessons derived from those comparative examinations should be applied early in 
the formation of the new development policies. 
Finally, because this paper is part of a larger project that is presently in 
process, it should, when that work is completed, be read in conjunction with those 
other papers. Doing so will provide a more detailed and broader picture of the 
issues involved, thus providing a better picture of the operation and effectiveness 
of the proposed legal cultural methodology—a methodology that can be applied 
69
Picker: International Trade and Development Law: A Legal Cultural Critique
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011






American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations §101 (1986). 
Armour, John and Priya Lele, Law, Finance and Politics: the Case of India, 43 
Law & Society Review (2009). 
Barnes, Wayne R., Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future 
International Commercial Code, 65 LA Law Review (2005). 
Bown, Chad P., Self Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute 
Settlement (Brookings, 2009). 
Bradlow, Daniel D., Development Decision Making and the Content of 
 International Development Law, 27 Boston College International and 
 Comparative Law Review (2004). 
Chen, An, “A Reflection on the South-South Coalition in the Last Half-Century 
from the Perspective of International Economic Law-Making: From 
Bandung, Doha and Cancun to Hong Kong”, in Yong-Shik Lee (eds.), 
Economic Development through World Trade: A Developing World 
Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
Cho, Sungjoon, Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on 
Trade Politics, 42 Wake Forest Law Review (2007). 
Etounga-Manguelle, Daniel, “Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program”, 
in Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters 
How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books, 2000). 
Glendon, Mary Ann, Paolo G. Carozza, & Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal 
Traditions: Texts, Materials And Cases On Western Law (3rd ed., Thomson 
West Publishing, 2007).  
Glenn, Patrick and H. Patrick, Legal Traditions of the World (4th ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
Glennon, Michael J., The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 Yale Journal of 
International Law (2010). 
Gordon, Ruth, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO 
Multilateral Trade Regime, 8 Berkeley Journal of African-American Policy 
Review (2006). 
Graham, Lorie and Stephen McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual 
Property, 19 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy (2005). 
Hoecke, Mark Van and Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and 
Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 
International Comparative Law Quarterly (1998). 
70
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 4 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://www.bepress.com/ldr/vol4/iss2/art4
Lee, Yong-Shik, “Development and the World Trade Organization: Proposal for 
the Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and 
Development in the WTO”, in Yong-Shik Lee (eds.), Economic 
Development through World Trade: A Developing World Perspective (The 
Hague: Klumer Law International, 2008). 
Leitner, Kara and Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2009--A 
Statistical Analysis, 13 Journal of International Economic Law Review 
(2010). 
Merryman, John Henry, David S. Clark, and John Owen Haley, Comparative 
Law: Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in Europe, Latin 
America, and East Asia (LexisNexis, 2010). 
Paul, J. R., Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2000). 
Picker, Colin B., “A Framework for Comparative Analyses of International Law 
and its Institutions: Using the Example of the World Trade Organization”, in 
E.C. Ritaine, S.P. Donlan, and M. Sychold (eds.), Comparative Law and 
Hybrid Legal systems (Swiss Institute of Comp. Law, 2010). 
____ China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the 
WTO, Parts 1 of 4, Proceedings of the University of Tokyo Institute of 
Social Science (forthcoming January 2011). 
____ “Islands of Prosperity and Poverty: A Rational Trade Development Policy 
for Economically Heterogeneous States”, in Yong-Shik Lee, Won-Mog 
Choi, Tomer Broude, & Gary Horlick (eds.), Law and Development 
Perspective on International Trade Law, (Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming 2011). 
____ Comparative Law Methodology & American Legal Culture: Obstacles and 
Opportunities, Roger Williams University of Law Review (forthcoming 
January 2011). 
____ International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2008). 
____ Colin B. Picker, Beyond the Usual Suspects: Application of the Mixed 
Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to International Law and Beyond, 3 Journal of 
Comparative Law (2008). 
____ Neither Here Nor There—Countries that Fall Between the Developed and 
the Developing World in the WTO, 36 George Washington International 
Law Review (2004). 
Schadbach, Kai, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European 
View, 16 Boston University International Law Journal (1998). 
World Trade Organization, European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998). 
 
71
Picker: International Trade and Development Law: A Legal Cultural Critique
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
